Freedom, as a product of the historical development of society, is one of the very greatest social values. It testifies to human control over objective forces of nature and society.

Freedom, as a product of the historical development of society, is one of the very greatest social values. It testifies to human control over objective forces of nature and society.

From the Editors:Such was the topic considered by members of a new discussion club, "The Free Word" [Svobodnoe slovo] , along with specialists from the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences.

From the Editors:Such was the topic considered by members of a new discussion club, "The Free Word" [Svobodnoe slovo], along with specialists from the Institute of Philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Vladimir Sergeevich Solov'ev was born on January 16, 1853, into the highly educated family of the outstanding Russian historian Sergei Mikhailovich Solov'ev. Solov'ev received his secondary education in the Fifth Moscow Gymnasium, and his higher education at Moscow University. At first Solov'ev studied in the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics. After three years and eight months there he left the university, but a few months later he stood his candidate's examination for the full university course in (...) the Faculty of History and Philology. At the same time as he was preparing his candidate's examination he audited lectures on theological and philosophical issues at the Moscow Spiritual Academy. (shrink)

Gentlemen! In inviting you to the free pursuit of philosophy, I should like first of all to reply to one question that may arise on this account. This question would be easy to dismiss as excessively naive, one that could only come from someone totally unfamiliar with philosophy. But since I have in mind mainly people who are as yet unfamiliar with philosophy, who have only just come to it, I cannot be so dismissive of this naive question, but rather (...) deem it better to answer it. (shrink)

Could anyone shake nineteenth century Russia out of herphilosophico-juridical stagnation? Was there anyone whodared speak of rights, of freedoms based on vital principles?Was there anyone who had the courage to suggest that the lawof force be turned into recognition of the force of law, orwas bold enough to call for the revival of natural law onits idealist reading? Solov'ëv turned out to be the thinkerwho was able to do these things. An amateur in juridicalquestions, remote from the enlightenment rationalizations (...) ofpolitical liberalism, Solov'ëv set out to lay the basis forjuridical freedom in way that was unexpected philosophicallyand culturally. (shrink)

Virtually the chief complaint thrown at Marxism by contemporary bourgeois philosophers is the accusation of undervaluation of "existential subject matter".

The author analyzes Mamardashvili's philosophical views by putting them in the context of contemporary Western philosophy, especially existentialism. He identifies unique features of Mamardashvili's philosophizing that he equates with existentially interpreted soteriology.

The author places Herzen's view of history in the context of the development of West European political philosophy—in particular, the concepts of "open history" and "historicism.".

Contrary to the widespread opinion that in the Soviet period the Institute of Philosophy had been a mere citadel of ideological dogmatism, the author shows that even in the most oppressive periods of stagnation not only did the institute resist the imposition of this atmosphere, but it openly refused to take part in any campaign of condemnation or ideological reprisal against nonconformists, whether in philosophy, literature, economics, or politics. The reigning atmosphere in the institute at that time was one of (...) glasnost, open argument, and constructive discussion. And the mediator of such an environment was the institute's Communist Party chapter, which among other positive influences, provided the institute and its associates with real protection from Stalinism, hostility, and societal pressure. While in the country as a whole there had never been a civil society, the institute always possessed and actively displayed the key features of such an institution. The famous wall newspaper published at the institute was one sign of such its civic-social maturity. (shrink)

I attempt to clarify the connection between two late texts by V.S. Solov''ëv: Justification of the Good and Theoretical Philosophy. Solov''ëv drew attention to the intrinsic connection between moral and intellectual virtues. Theoretical Philosophy is the initial -- unfinished -- sketch of the dynamism of mind seeking truth as a good. I sketch several parallels and analogies between the doctrine of moral experience set out in Justification and the account of the intellect''s dynamism based on immediate certitude set (...) out in Theoretical Philosophy. Solov''ëv can thus be considered as a virtue epistemologist in the current meaning given to this description. I conclude by suggesting that Solov''ëv''s position on these questions does not easily cohere with the impersonalism he appears to defend in Theoretical Philosophy. (shrink)

I attempt to clarify the connection between two late texts by V.S. Solov'ëv: Justification of the Good and Theoretical Philosophy. Solov'ëv drew attention to the intrinsic connection between moral and intellectual virtues. Theoretical Philosophy is the initial -- unfinished -- sketch of the dynamism of mind seeking truth as a good. I sketch several parallels and analogies between the doctrine of moral experience set out in Justification and the account of the intellect's dynamism based on immediate certitude set (...) out in Theoretical Philosophy. Solov'ëv can thus be considered as a ‘virtue epistemologist’ in the current meaning given to this description. I conclude by suggesting that Solov'ëv's position on these questions does not easily cohere with the ‘impersonalism’ he appears to defend in Theoretical Philosophy. (shrink)

The law of negation of the negation as it appears in the economic writings of Marx in general, and in Capital in particular, has repeatedly been treated in our philosophical literature in one way or another. To this day, however, as judged from the literature, attention has not been directed to the principle of negation of the negation as it is manifested not only in Marx's historical but also in his logical analysis. Negation of the negation has been examined primarily (...) as a form of expression of historical analysis . In the present article the emphasis is upon negation of the negation in logical analysis, upon the function of this principle considered as form of motion dealt with by historical analysis. All the examples of negation of the negation in historical analysis that have already been treated in the literature are omitted quite consciously, to avoid repetition. Nor is anything said about the structure of Capital as a "dialectically subdivided whole" in connection with negation of the negation, as that question has been splendidly handled in the book by L. A. Man'kovskii referred to in the footnote. (shrink)

The main concern of both Berdjaev's and Bulgakov's philosophical strivings consists in developing a concept of the person as the foundation of human dignity and creativity within a Christian world view. Once attracted by Marxism with its emphasis on human dignity and social justice, they started to struggle against Marxism's atheist materialism because of its lack of a concept of person. However, the same concern will lead both thinkers down very different paths with different consequences. This paper argues that, even (...) though Berdjaev has become famous as a philosopher of the person and a herald of creative ethics, Bulgakov developed a more solid Christian justification of the same claims. Both systems are presented by means of comparing some crucial notions within their concepts of personality—potentiality, trinity and autonomy. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology attempts both to familiarize readers with the directions in which the scholarship of this discipline has gone and to pursue the discussion into hitherto under-examined areas. Philosophical theology is aimed primarily at theoretical understanding of the nature and attributes of God and of God's relationship to the world and its inhabitants. During the twentieth century, much of the philosophical community (both in the Anglo-American analytic tradition and in Continental circles) had grave doubts about our (...) ability to attain any such understanding. In recent years the analytic tradition in particular has moved beyond the biases that placed obstacles in the way of the pursuing questions located at the interface of philosophy and religion. Written by some of the leading scholars in the field, the articles in the book are grouped into five sections. In the first section, articles focus on the authority of scripture and tradition, on the nature and mechanisms of divine revelation, on the relation between religion and science, and on theology and mystery. The next section focuses on philosophical problems connected with the central divine attributes: aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. In the third section, articles explore theories of divine action and divine providence, questions about petitionary prayer, problems about divine authority and God's relationship to morality and moral standards, and various formulations of and responses to the problem of evil. The fourth section examines philosophical problems that arise in connection with such central Christian doctrines as the trinity, the incarnation, the atonement, original sin, resurrection, and the Eucharist. Finally, the fifth section introduces readers to current work in Jewish, Islamic, and Chinese philosophical theology. (shrink)

The psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore (B&M). Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.